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Elections, Neutrality Agreements, and Card Checks: The
Failure of the Political Model of Industrial Democracy
JAMES Y. MOORE* AND RICHARD A. BALES**
ABSTRACT
The secret-ballot election is the National Labor Relations Board’s preferred
method for employees to determine whether they wish to be represented by a union.
Employer domination of the election process, however, has led many unions to opt
out of elections and instead to demand recognition based on authorization cards
signed by a majority of employees. The primary objection to this “card check”
process is that it is less democratic than the secret-ballot election. This Article
places the issue in the context of the theoretical basis for claims of industrial
democracy and argues that card checks are more consistent with the basic
premises of industrial democracy than are extant Board elections.
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was passed in 1935 and provides the
framework that governs labor relations in the United States.1 The NLRA was
designed to protect commerce from industrial unrest by regulating the process of
unionization to ensure that the free choice of employees is the primary factor in
selecting who will represent labor and bargain collectively on its behalf.2
The National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) favors certified elections as a
way of determining what the free choice of employees actually is.3 The preference
for secret ballots is often analogized to the democratic political process. The central
feature of the American political system and the starting point for the legitimacy of
government is a secret-ballot election. The belief in the soundness of an electoral
mandate has been transferred to the field of industrial democracy.4
However, to unions, their organizers, and employees sympathetic to
unionization, the analogy between Board elections and democratic elections breaks
down in practice. Many in the labor movement dispute the efficacy of the NLRA
and its use of elections in the organization context. For instance, Lane Kirkland,
former president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), famously stated that the NLRA should be repealed and
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1. See Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 151–69 (2006)).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
3. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
4. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects
for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 821 (2005).
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that workers would be “better off with the law of the jungle.”5 Alternatively, many
unions promote the amendment of the NLRA to include the use of neutrality
agreements and card check recognition.
By contrast, many employers and politicians (and some legal scholars) continue
to support the Board’s preference for the secret ballot as the sole method of
certification.6 A recent Rasmussen poll states that 61% of Americans believe the
use of a secret ballot in labor elections is fair, while 52% of Americans believe the
use of card checks is unfair.7
Both sides claim to support employee free choice. However, if employee free
choice is the essential substance of industrial democracy, then the best way to
protect it is to expand the use of neutrality agreements and card checks at the
expense of the traditional Board-certified election. This fact can be demonstrated in
three ways: The first is an exploration of what industrial democracy means and
where the analogy to political democracy came from. The second is an examination
of how Board elections actually work, as opposed to how neutrality agreements and
card checks function. The third is an analysis of the various arguments used to
support or oppose Board elections.
Part I of this Article will introduce the issue of whether the traditional Board
election should give way to the use of neutrality agreements and card check
recognition. Part II will examine the meaning of industrial democracy and the
analogy to political democracy. Part III will give a brief synopsis of Board-election
procedure and explain the tactics used by employers that make Board elections
difficult for unions to win. Part IV of this Article will start with a description of the
development of card checks and neutrality agreements. It will explain how
neutrality agreements work and why employers might agree to them. Part V will
discuss whether card check recognition erodes the basic elements of employee free
choice and whether it, too, should be a vehicle for Board certification. Part VI
concludes that neutrality agreements and card checks are consistent with employee
free choice.
I. THE “DEMOCRACY” ANALOG
A. The Democratic Model
The analogy to political democracy that is summed up by the term “industrial
democracy” is an ideology of social interaction between employers and employees
that eschews outside interference and instead envisions workers sufficiently
empowered to look after themselves.8 According to this model, the NLRA9

5. Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a ‘Dead
Letter,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8.
6. See Brudney, supra note 4, at 841.
7. Rasmussen Reports, 61% Say Secret Ballot Is Fair Way to Vote for a Union,
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/jobs_employment/march_2009/6
1_say_secret_ballot_is_fair_way_to_vote_for_a_union.
8. See, e.g., Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 999, 1007 (1955) (arguing that the collective bargaining process and the grievance
procedures created therein constitute an “autonomous rule of law”); Katherine Van Wezel
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establishes a framework through which employees can organize to acquire the
bargaining power necessary to significantly influence wages, working conditions,
and other terms and conditions of employment.10
Thus transformed, workplace relations are analogous to miniature political
democracies11 in which employers and employees, roughly coequal,12 jointly
negotiate and enforce13 an agreement that establishes the terms and conditions of
employment.14 The process of collective bargaining thus “gives employees a voice
in decisions [that significantly] influence[] their lives,”15 freeing them from the
dictatorships established by the lords of industry.16
Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment
Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 622–24
(1992) (discussing the industrial democratic understanding of constructing an autonomous
workplace); Richard A. Bales, Note, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Conflicts
Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 CORNELL J. LAW & PUB.
POL’Y 161, 162–64 (1992) (describing the industrial democracy model and how it is
embodied in the NLRA).
9. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423 (1993) (stating that
“[w]hile the diminished bargaining power of individual workers vitiated the normative force
of their voluntary choice to submit to the authority of the large-scale enterprise, collective
bargaining would empower workers sufficiently to cleanse that choice of duress”); Shulman,
supra note 8, at 1000 (explaining that the NLRA established a “bare legal framework [that]
is hardly an encroachment on the premise that wages and other conditions of employment be
left to autonomous determination by employers and labor”); see also National Labor
Relations Act § 151 (citing the “inequality of bargaining power” between centralized
employers and employees “who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract” as a reason that the NLRA was needed); 78 CONG. REC. 3678 (1934) (statement
of Sen. Wagner) (arguing that there must be equality of bargaining power which is
accomplished through the employees’ right to participate in collective bargaining).
11. See e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 275–76 (1948) (comparing collective bargaining agreement
with administrative and legislative processes); Stone, supra note 8 (stating that labor and
management are like political parties in a democracy, each with its own constituency and
agenda); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard,
67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 9 (1988) (noting that “collective bargaining provide[d] a measure of
industrial democracy”).
12. See JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 43
(4th rev. ed. 1936) (stating that employees are empowered by collective bargaining and
minimum wage laws that create equal bargaining power between employees and their
employer).
13. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 663, 742 (1973) (noting that “[t]he enforcement mechanism . . . is the essence
of the industrial collective bargaining agreement” assuming that both labor and management
comply with the jointly agreed rules).
14. See CLINTON S. GOLDEN & HAROLD J. RUTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY 30 (1942) (noting the role of labor and management in collective bargaining).
15. Summers, supra note 11 (noting the entry of democratic ideology into the
workplace).
16. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
580–81 (1960) (noting that collective bargaining agreements allow labor and management to
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The NLRA, according to the industrial democracy model, confers no substantive
employment rights, but rather establishes the framework through which employees
may negotiate their own rights.17 Indeed, industrial democracy signifies an end to
individual employment bargaining.18 The collective bargaining process is thought
to be adequate to protect whatever rights workers feel are worth negotiating for,
and the essentially democratic nature of union representation ensures that workers’
voices are adequately represented at the bargaining table.19
B. Collective Autonomy
The NLRA shifted workplace sovereignty from employers and the courts to
employers and employees, creating a framework for the joint determination of
workplace rights through the elective bargaining process.20 Establishing an internal
mechanism for resolving disputes between employers and employees was critical to
maintaining this shift in sovereignty.21 Arbitration quickly became this
mechanism.22
govern the workplace with input from both parties); GOLDEN & RUTTENBERG, supra note 14,
at 23–47 (noting the role of labor and management in collective bargaining); Barenberg,
supra note 10, at 1424 (recognizing the goal of collective bargaining as “freedom for selfdirection, self-control [and] cooperation” (footnote omitted)); William M. Leiserson,
Constitutional Government in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 66 (1922)
(arguing that labor gained strength by organizing and thus weakened managements’ absolute
power).
17. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511 (1981) (noting that it is through collective bargaining that
management and labor formulate the rules under which the workplace is governed).
18. See GOLDEN & RUTTENBERG, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that in order to benefit
from collective bargaining all workers must give up their freedom to bargain independently);
Stone, supra note 8, at 624 (noting that the industrial democratic model is not capable of
handling individual employment rights issues and instead focuses on group issues).
19. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 580 (discussing how collective
bargaining provides an opportunity for input to both management and labor); GOLDEN &
RUTTENBERG, supra note 14, at 43 (noting that the collective bargaining process attempts to
build a body of industrial law between a particular employer and his employees); Stone,
supra note 8, at 593 (noting how the NLRA aims to create a framework upon which to
construct an agreement mutually beneficial to labor and management).
20. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 580 (noting that “[a] collective
bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government”). An
exception to this shift in sovereignty is the doctrine of reserved management rights, which
permits unilateral employer decision making over issues “at the core of entrepreneurial
control.” Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); accord First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981)
(concluding that an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to close part of its
operations); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (holding that an employer has no
duty to bargain over a decision to transfer work from one facility to another).
21. See GOLDEN & RUTTENBERG, supra note 14, at 37 (noting that in the early 1940s the
role of the NLRB shifted from an enforcer of collective bargaining agreements to a
supervisor of elections and that this event “mark[ed] the end of [an era] during
which . . . unions and management looked to the government for the solution of their
problems”); Leiserson, supra note 16, at 75 (noting the shift in sovereignty away from the
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In the metaphor of industrial democracy, the workplace “legislature”
promulgated the law of the shop through collective bargaining negotiations.23
Arbitration, as an analog to the judiciary,24 provided the mechanism by which that
law was interpreted and applied. Not only did arbitration serve the instrumental
function of interpreting and applying the law, it also fit the theoretical model of an
autonomous system.25 The arbitrator was chosen by, and served at the whim of, the
two parties, and the arbitrator’s authority was derived exclusively from the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement that the parties had negotiated.26 Arbitration
hands of owners and managers into a democratic system).
22. See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–99 (1960)
(noting that “the arbitrators under these collective agreements are indispensable agencies in a
continuous collective bargaining process” and further discussing the federal policy toward
arbitration in these agreements); Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (noting that a
collective bargaining agreement will often provide for the use of arbitration to settle
disputes); United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960) (noting that
arbitration will be used for all grievances involving interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement).
23. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (stating that arbitration of
collective bargaining agreement provisions creates a “system of private law”); Leiserson,
supra note 16, at 75 (stating that trade agreements result in a predictable, constitution-like
form of business government); Stone, supra note 8, at 623 (suggesting that workplace
legislation is enacted and contained in the collective bargaining agreement).
24. See Leiserson, supra note 16, at 63 (noting how arbitration can be used to settle
grievances, much like a court’s judicial power); Stone, supra note 8, at 623 (stating that
“private arbitration is supposed to provide a neutral vantage point for enforcing the
[workplace] rules”).
25. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (noting that the
integral role of the arbitrator in the industrial pluralist system helps establish industrial selfgovernment); Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (recognizing that “the grievance
machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of
industrial self-government” and that “[a]rbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable
by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise”); Shulman, supra
note 8, at 1007 (noting that collective bargaining agreements force the parties to handle their
disputes guided by contract terms, if dispute procedures are provided for in the agreement).
26. See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 53 (stating that an arbitrator “has no general
authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties”); Enter.
Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 597 (stating that an arbitral “award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” and that an arbitration award
that relies on external law instead of the collective bargaining agreement fails this test);
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582 (noting that the arbitrator’s authority is only
limited by the collective bargaining agreement’s terms); Harry T. Edwards, Labor
Arbitration at the Crossroads: The ‘Common Law of the Shop’ v. External Law, 32 ARB. J.
65, 90–91 (1977) (stating that arbitrators should be reluctant to decide public law issues
because they may be wrong and, if followed by a court out of deference to the arbitrator,
they may distort the development of precedent); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About
Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 557–59 (1967) (stating that
“parties typically call on an arbitrator to construe and not to destroy their agreement”);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140–43 (1977) (stating that an
award must “draw its essence” from the collective bargaining agreement in order to be valid
and enforceable) (quoting Enter. Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 597). The late Dean Shulman
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thus completed the metaphor of industrial organization “as a self-contained minidemocracy”—“an island of self-rule whose self-regulating mechanisms must not be
disrupted by judicial intervention or other scrutiny by outsiders.”27
III. TRADITIONAL ELECTIONS
A. The Operation of a Traditional Organization Campaign
Dissatisfaction with the NLRA’s election framework has caused unions to begin
using the neutrality agreement, coupled with card checks. The neutrality agreement
is a contractual agreement in which the union persuades the employer, whose
employees the particular union is attempting to organize, to remain neutral and not
oppose the organization efforts.28 Card check recognition is usually associated with
neutrality agreements.29 The general rule is that, if an employer agrees to card
check recognition, the employer can be required to bargain with a union that
obtains cards from a majority of employees in a bargaining unit authorizing that
union to represent the employees.30 The neutrality agreement/card check method of
organization is growing in popularity, but its preeminence is not assured.31 To
understand why unions are dissatisfied with the traditional Board election, a brief
description of the election process may help.
The standard method of union organization is a Board-supervised election by
secret ballot. As a first step in this process, employees contact a union and the
organization drive begins.32 The union distributes authorization cards to
sympathetic employees; it is trying to get a majority of the employees to state that
they want the union to be their bargaining agent.33 If the union is able to get an
uncoerced majority, it presents the cards to the employer; the employer has the
option of voluntarily recognizing the union, or it can demand a Board election.34
During the eve of the election, the employer urges its employees to vote against
unionization, while the union tries to convince them to vote for it.35
stated that
[a] proper conception of the arbitrator’s function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a
community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of selfgovernment created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure
only, to administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement.
Shulman, supra note 8, at 1016.
27. Stone, supra note 17, at 1515.
28. See William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the
State of Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82
IND. L.J. 461, 484 (2007).
29. See Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements
and the Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589, 1590 (2008).
30. Id. at 1590–91.
31. Brudney, supra note 4, at 827.
32. Id. at 824.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
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B. Employer Activity During Election Campaigns
The certification of a victory by the union obligates the employer to begin the
collective bargaining process and protects the victorious union from challenge by
rival unions.36 The system may seem reasonable, but less obvious issues have
caused disenchantment among unions with the current election process. Most
employers are not willing to lose the Board election contest.
Employers can and do use a wide array of electioneering techniques against
unions. Some legal techniques that employers often use include the hiring of
outside consultants to manage the anti-union campaign, the encouragement of
“‘Vote No’ committees comprised of employees that oppose the union,” and the
effective disclosure of the employers’ views on unionization through the
distribution of pamphlets and the mailing of letters.37 Another technique employers
often use is a “captive audience speech.” The employees are rounded up on
company time and required to listen to anti-labor speeches given by their employer.
Captive audience speeches have “proved to be an extremely devastating technique
in organizational campaigns.”38 All of these techniques have an enhanced
effectiveness because the employer has the power to greatly restrict union access to
employees.39
The list of legal techniques does not end the discussion of anti-union activities
routinely engaged in by employers.40 Although it is illegal for an employer to
“threaten to fire, or actually fire an employee because of that employee’s union
activities,” it still occurs.41 Employers regularly engage in other illegal activities
such as threatening to close the operation if the employees vote for union
representation as well as promising or implementing benefits, bonuses, or other
changes in the terms and conditions of employment.42
C. Remedies
In theory, employers who engage in illegal anti-organizing activities are subject
to penalties under the NLRA. If a union believes the employer is using unfair labor
practices to defeat its organization drive, it can file a complaint with the local
National Labor Relations field office.43 The local office then investigates to

36. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 89 (4th ed. 2004).
37. Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Card Check Recognition: New House Rules
for Union Organizing?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 251–52 (2008).
38. Gould, supra note 28, at 484; see also David J. Doorey, The Medium and the “AntiUnion” Message: “Forced Listening” and Captive Audience Meetings in Canadian Labor
Law, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 79 (2008); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of
State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United
States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008).
39. GOULD, supra note 36, at 72.
40. See Gely & Chandler, supra note 37, at 252 (describing various illegal activities
engaged in on a regular basis).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Robert M. Worster, III, Case Note, If It’s Hardly Worth Doing, It’s Hardly Worth

154

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:147

determine whether the NLRA has been violated and, if so, will either encourage a
settlement or file a formal complaint against the offending party.44 An
administrative law judge will make the initial decision, but it can be appealed to the
Board. The Board’s decision can be appealed to a federal court of appeals45 and
possibly to the Supreme Court.46 If the final ruling is against the employer, then the
Board may impose a number of restorative remedies.47
“Access Remedies,” including cease and desist orders, are supposed to allow the
union to communicate with employees free from employer interference, and
“Notice Remedies” are supposed to inform employees of their rights under the
NLRA and assure them of protection from their employer.48 These are common
remedies imposed when employers cheat during an organization drive.49 “Make
Whole” remedies include back pay and reinstatement, and these remedies are
supposed to restore workers who have been discharged in contravention of the
NLRA.50
D. Traditional Election Results
Legal and illegal employer activities greatly affect the outcome of elections.
While in recent years the union success rate in elections has increased to nearly
60%,51 the number is misleading when put in terms of the union members
organized. The success rate steadily declines as the size of the employer increases.
In elections involving 100–499 employees, the success rate drops to 42%; in
elections involving 500 or more workers, the success rate is a mere 37%.52 These
numbers demonstrate why unions have been in search of a better option.
IV. CARD CHECKS AND NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
A. The Development of Card Checks
Card checks have been around since the NLRA was passed. Under the original
Act, card checks were more important than they are today. The original section 9(c)
of the NLRA allowed the Board to “take a secret ballot election or utilize any other
suitable method” to determine whether a union had majority support for
certification purposes.53 Until the 1939 Cudahy Packing Co.54 decision ended the

Doing Right: How the NLRA’s Goals Are Defeated Through Inadequate Remedies, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2004).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1076.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Brudney, supra note 4, at 827.
52. Id. at 830.
53. Recognition and Withdrawal of Recognition Without an Election, in 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 678, 682 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Recognition] (quoting
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practice, the Board used card checks as its primary “other suitable method.”55 In
1947, Congress formally stripped the “other suitable method” language from
section 9(c) with the Taft-Hartley Amendments.56
The next major development occurred with the Court’s decision in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co.57 In Gissel, the Court answered three questions. The first was
“[w]hether the duty to bargain can arise without a Board election under the
[NLRA].”58 The Court held in the affirmative, stating that while certification could
only occur after an election, an employer’s duty to bargain could arise without
one.59
The second question the Court answered was “whether union authorization
cards, if obtained from a majority of employees without misrepresentation or
coercion, are reliable enough generally to provide a valid, alternate route to
majority status.”60 Again, the Court held in the affirmative.61 Although the Court
expressed a preference for an election, it decided that where an employer engages
in unfair labor practices to such an extent that an election either has to be
overturned or one cannot fairly be held, cards can be used to measure employee
support for a union.62
Then the Court reached the question of “whether a bargaining order is an
appropriate and authorized remedy where an employer rejects a card majority while
at the same time committing unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the
union’s majority and make a fair election an unlikely possibility.”63 The only
important aspect of the Court’s holding (in regard to card checks) was that where
an employer merely impedes the electoral process but does not make it impossible,
a union can seek a bargaining order if it can show majority status via cards.64
Following Gissel, the next Supreme Court case to help lay the groundwork for
the modern use of the card check was Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB.65 In
Linden Lumber Division, the Court rejected a claim by a union for recognition
based on a card majority.66 The Court laid down the rule that while an employer
who has not engaged in unfair labor practices cannot be forced to recognize card
checks, the employer can still agree to be bound by them.67 Gissel and Linden
Lumber Division put in place the legal framework necessary to give rise to the
modern neutrality agreement that includes a card check provision.
Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 733 (1961)).
54. 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939) (deciding in a dispute between two possible representatives
an election should be held to decide in favor of one, instead of relying on previously
acquired cards).
55. Recognition, supra note 53, at 680–81 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 682, n.7.
57. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
58. Id. at 579.
59. Recognition, supra note 53, at 690–91.
60. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 579.
61. Id.
62. Recognition, supra note 53, at 691.
63. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 579.
64. Recognition, supra note 53, at 693.
65. 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
66. Recognition, supra note 53, at 723.
67. Id. at 723–24.
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A neutrality agreement was first used in 1976 between the United Auto Workers
(UAW) and General Motors (GM).68 GM agreed that it would “‘neither discourage
nor encourage the [UAW’s] efforts in organizing” other GM employees.69 The
agreement was actually in an existing collective bargaining agreement with the
UAW, but it did not take long for unions to realize they could convince employers,
with whom they had no preexisting relationship, to enter into neutrality
agreements.70
Increasingly, modern organization campaigns employ a neutrality agreement.
The AFL-CIO organized nearly three million workers from 1998 to 2003, with less
than one-fifth coming from traditional elections.71 In contrast, in 2004 the AFLCIO reported organizing 150,000 to 200,000 new members through card checks,
compared to only 70,000 through traditional elections.72 One union reported
organizing over 100,000 workers through neutrality agreements; other studies have
suggested organization campaigns under agreements that have both neutrality and
card check provisions have a success rate of 78.2%.73
However, one study has challenged some of the seemingly glowing results of
neutrality agreements. Rafael Gely and Timothy Chandler argue that, from 1998 to
2005, the majority of workers were organized through government-sponsored
elections.74 They also claim that most of the organizing success with neutrality
agreements is limited to specific industries, while most employers continue to
oppose card checks and prefer Board procedures.75
Under the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, unions selected via
neutrality agreements involving card check authorization do not receive the sort of
protections that certification after a traditional election provides.76 If a union wins a
traditional election, it receives a “certification year,” a year-long period of time
during which no decertification election can be held.77 A union selected via a card
check does not receive a “certification year.” Instead, it is given a reasonable time
before it can lose its status as bargaining agent. In the past, the Board has
analogized the “reasonable period of time” to the certification year.78
However, that may no longer be the case, because a recent change in Board
policy threatens to challenge the use of card checks in neutrality agreements. In
Dana Corp., the Board established several conditions that must be satisfied before
any election bar can be put in place.79 For example, a notice must have been posted
informing employees of the recognition of a bargaining representative and a period

68. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1592.
69. Brudney, supra note 4, at 825, (citing Auto Workers Approve General Motors
Contract, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A–13 (Dec. 8, 1976)).
70. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1592.
71. Brudney, supra note 4, at 828.
72. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1593–94.
73. Id. at 1594.
74. Gely & Chandler, supra note 37, at 250.
75. Id.
76. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (c)(1)(B) (2006).
77. See Gould, supra note 28, at 489.
78. Id.
79. 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
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of forty-five days must pass without more than 30% of the employees filing a
petition for decertification.80 These new requirements threaten to greatly undermine
the use of card checks by unions.
B. How Neutrality Agreements Operate
The standard neutrality agreement is a voluntary, contractual pledge of
neutrality from the employer. The only communications with the employees
allowed might be to let the employer communicate “facts” to employees in
response to inquiries.81 The neutrality agreement may prohibit the employer from
communicating opposition to the union, and may also require the employer to
explain to the employees that the employer welcomes the chance to bring in the
union,82 or obligate the employer “to create [an election] climate free of fear,
hostility, and coercion.”83 The union may have obligations too, including the duty
to refrain from anti-employer comments.84
Also, 65% of neutrality agreements contain provisions that obligate the
employer to recognize the results of a card check drive.85 More than 90% of
neutrality agreements contain an alternative dispute resolution clause, usually
arbitration, to solve interpretational problems with the agreement.86 However, the
Board will usually step in to handle disagreements over representational issues,
such as the definition of the proper bargaining unit.87 In International Ladies’
Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB,88 the Supreme Court ruled that an employer’s
recognition of a union lacking majority support is an unfair labor practice
regardless of good faith and thus laid down the requirement that a neutral third
party verify the process.89
The neutrality agreement/card check process helps union organizing efforts;90
however, it is less clear what employers have to gain from agreeing to a neutrality
agreement. It appears that employers sign neutrality agreements out of a rational
consideration of economic costs.91 Despite considering factors such as “increased
labor costs . . . , diminished attractiveness as a merger or takeover target . . . , and
the possible loss of a more cooperative work culture,” entering into a neutrality
agreement can make economic sense.92 An employer can avoid the costs associated

80. Id. at 434.
81. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 1603.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality
and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 53 (2001)).
84. Id.
85. Brudney, supra note 4, at 826.
86. Id. at 827.
87. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1598.
88. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
89. Gould, supra note 28, at 484.
90. Gely & Chandler, supra note 37, at 253–54.
91. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1592–93.
92. Brudney, supra note 4, at 836.
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with a work stoppage and picketing.93 Employers can also avoid losses caused by
secondary union activity such as a lack of access to capital or other support from
municipalities and union pension funds, or boycotts by religious groups or civic
organizations.94
However, employers also have less coercive reasons to abide by neutrality
agreements. Employers may be able to attract new business. In a specific case, an
auto parts supplier signed a neutrality agreement with the UAW; in return, the
UAW pushed Ford, Chrysler, and GM to increase their business with union auto
parts suppliers.95 Hotel chains and health providers have been able to attract new
visitors and expand their patient bases, respectively.96 Unions will often agree to
send their members to patronize businesses that have agreed to neutrality
agreements.97 Employers can also expect to get benefits from government. While
gaining state financing is a major aspect of the appeal, less obvious advantages
include a friendlier disposition from pro-union law makers, a favorable
determination from regulatory agencies, or a favorable judicial settlement.98
Casinos have used unions as a reliable source of skilled labor and are thus more
willing to sign neutrality agreements.99
Once again, Gely and Chandler caution not to draw too broad a conclusion.
They argue that while it may be clear that some employers can benefit financially
from card checks, it does not mean that all employers will be convinced of the
economic advantage.100 Evidence of continued employer opposition can be seen by
the list of employer organizations arrayed against card checks.101 There is no real
reason to expect these employers to drop their opposition to union organizing,
either through neutrality agreements that incorporate card checks, or if card check
recognition is ever written into law, through smarter anti-union activity.102
V. ELECTIONS AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
The notion of “one person, one vote” in relation to political democracy enjoys
great favor among Americans. Notwithstanding the analogy to political democracy,
the Employee Free Choice Act of 2009 (EFCA) was introduced in the U.S. House
with 227 cosponsors.103 If passed, this bill would significantly supplant Board
elections. The EFCA amends section 9(c) of the NLRA to require the Board to
certify card check authorizations in addition to traditional Board supervised
elections.104 The reason the EFCA was introduced is that there is a stark divide
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between those who believe the “one person, one vote” paradigm of industrial
democracy should be as inviolable as it is in democratic electoral politics, and those
who believe that elections are simply no longer capable of reflecting employee
choice.
A. Arguments Against Card Checks and Neutrality Agreements
Opponents of card checks have advanced a number of arguments to either
discredit the card check process itself or to support the status quo as represented by
Board elections.105 The first is the notion that union organizers will apply undue
influence on workers. The second is that card checks result in a reduction in the
amount of information about unions that is available to employees. The final
argument is that the use of card checks and neutrality agreements amount to an
employer providing unlawful support to a particular union.
The strongest argument against card checks is that union organizers will apply
undue influence on workers, or otherwise intimidate them into signing
authorization cards. One House republican stated, “[U]nion thugs had used physical
force to have workers sign pro-union cards.”106 In Dana Corp., one of the reasons
the majority considered card checks inferior to elections was perceived union
misconduct.107 Despite the fact that union coercion or fraud in conducting the card
check campaign was never entered in the record before the Board,108 the majority in
Dana Corp. still worried about “group pressure exerted at the moment of
choice.”109
Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky, however, have concluded that “management’s
pressure on workers to oppose unionization was significantly greater than pressure
from co-workers or organizers (or management) to support the union in both card
checks and elections.”110 They also were able to determine that union organizers
were no more likely to exert undue pressure on workers during a card-check
campaign than during an election.111
Second, those who oppose the use of card checks often argue that employers
will not be able to adequately explain to their employees the downside of union
representation.112 However, the NLRA gives employers only the right to oppose
union organizing; it does not impose a duty of opposition on them.113 Section 8(c)
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of the NLRA grants employers the right to speak out against union organizing.114 A
right can be waived if the waiver is made “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly
. . . with full awareness of the legal consequences.”115 Typically neutrality
agreements, which are carefully negotiated between sophisticated parties, will
satisfy the waiver standard, and there should be no issue with a denial of section
8(c) rights to the employer.116
There is a second element to the argument that neutrality agreements deprive
employees of information—one the Board in Dana Corp. explicitly recognized:
“[U]nion card-solicitation campaigns have been accompanied by misinformation or
a lack of information about employees’ representational options.”117 In essence, a
waiver of an employer’s section 8(c) right erodes the employees’ right to freely
organize.118 However, the NLRA grants employees no right to receive information
from an employer.119
Eaton and Kriesky found that while there is some suggestion that employees
receive less information during card check organization campaigns, this is largely
due to the neutrality agreement and not the use of authorization cards.120 It is as
much an argument to amend the NLRA to allow card check authorization without
requiring a union to seek a neutrality agreement as it is an argument for elections.
Further, even if the employer does not have an opportunity to give information to
its employees, interested business groups and chambers of commerce are still able
to discuss the downside of unions and do so with “access [that] is comparable to
what unions traditionally experience in our legal regime.”121
Finally, section 8(a)(2) prohibits employers from dominating, supporting, or
interfering with the formation of labor organizations.122 Card check opponents
argue that an employer’s agreement to remain neutral and recognize card checks is
essentially “contributing unlawful support or assistance toward a labor
organization’s success.”123 However, the Board and the appellate courts rejected
this line of argument.124 A neutrality agreement is only an agreement to remain
neutral, not to aid union organization. In practice, this argument also lacks a valid
premise. Union competition is not usually a significant factor in the modern
organizational context. Most neutrality agreements arise after a union has partially
organized an employer, and a long-standing relationship has already been
established between the union and that employer.125 In addition, the AFL-CIO
strongly discourages competition between member unions.126
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B. Arguments for Card Checks and Neutrality Agreements
From the union standpoint, card checks and neutrality agreements work. The
success rates for organization drives that utilize them are higher than those that
employ Board certified elections.127 The number of workers organized through card
checks and neutrality agreements is in the millions.128 However, there are more
reasons that the use of card checks and neutrality agreements should be expanded.
First, they can go a long way toward correcting the imbalance caused by the
weakness of NLRA remedies for employer misconduct. Second, the use of Board
elections is inconsistent with industrial democracy. Finally, card checks provide an
opportunity for a real industrial democracy.
During a traditional Board election, the employer resists unionization from the
start.129 In many cases, both legal and illegal anti-union organizing techniques are
on the table.130 The remedies available to unions under the existing NLRA
framework often fail to deal with unfair labor practices used by employers.131 One
problem with the official remedy process is the weakness of available remedies.
Cease-and-desist orders basically tell the employer not to break the law again.
However, if the employer does so, the Board may seek another court order to hand
down an additional cease and desist command, like an “unarmed police officer’s
order to ‘stop or I will say stop again.’”132 A notice remedy may inform employees
of their rights under the NLRA, but it does nothing to protect employees or to
punish employers.133 Besides, the courts will sometimes refuse to issue an order on
the grounds that it may humiliate the employer and injure the employer’s relations
with its employees later.134
Reinstatement remedies often fail because relatively few employees seek
reinstatement.135 The lack of desire to work for employers that are willing to break
the law and the delays caused by both the Board’s caseload and the appeals process
discourage employees from pursuing this option.136 Back pay is one of the more
powerful remedies available, but its effectiveness is diluted by the duty of the
employee to mitigate damages and the tendency of employers to treat back pay
damages as a “cost of doing business.”137
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The use of neutrality agreements and card checks can avoid the weaknesses of
NLRA remedies. Neutrality agreements can prevent an employer from bringing the
full array of anti-union techniques by requiring the employer to sit on the sidelines.
Even if an employer ignores its obligations, the neutrality agreement can provide
for a quicker remedy through arbitration or contract claims instead of waiting for
the Board to do something.138 An amendment to the NLRA allowing card check
certification without a neutrality agreement would help. An employer might not
know about a card check campaign until after it was completed, or lack the time to
wear down its employees’ resolve if it did find out.
Second, a comparison of political elections with their use in industrial
organization reveals another reason for the use of card checks. In a political
election, both candidates get to speak directly to voters, and then only if the voter is
interested in listening to the candidate. In a Board election, the employer can keep
nonemployee organizers off the premises, while requiring employees to listen to
anti-union speeches and fire any employees who do not attend or who publicly
disagree with the message.139 Such asymmetry would not be tolerated in politics,
yet this is the standard in Board elections. The analogy between industrial
democracy and political democracy does not work, because it is comparing apples
to oranges.
Finally, Board elections are not democratic because employers are able to
effectively quash employee free choice. Card check recognition and neutrality
agreements, by contrast, can effectuate the basic elements of industrial democracy.
An employer and union must still arrive at a collectively bargained-for agreement if
an uncoerced majority of employees has organized for that purpose.140 An
arbitration agreement provides the means for settling disagreements between the
union and employer;141 this is not changed by the use of card check recognition.
The individual worker’s rights are still entirely defined by the agreement,142 and the
government will not interfere any more than it would after a Board election. The
primary difference is that a card check majority has a far better chance of actually
registering employee free choice.
CONCLUSION
The rate of private sector union membership has steadily declined since the
1970s.143 Part of this decline has been the result of deregulation, technological
advances, and foreign competition, and it will not go away no matter how labor law
is reformed.144 If American labor policy is supposed to ensure that only these
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economic forces and the free choice of labor determine the outcome of organization
efforts, then something must be done. Employers have become experts at exploiting
the traditional Board election process. The arguments against card check
recognition are either far weaker than they first appear or are emotional appeals to a
defective analogy to political democracy. Board elections are no longer capable of
effectuating the central purpose of the NLRA—the recognition of employee free
choice. Not only are card checks and neutrality agreements consistent with the
basic premises of industrial democracy, but they represent a way to level the
playing field and give full effect to the purpose of the NLRA.

